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William Fast—COL Fast, USA (Ret.), facilitates acquisition and program management courses at the 
Naval Postgraduate School. He also writes and speaks on various management topics and provides 
consultation services to defense acquisition programs. From 2006–2010, COL Fast taught program 
and financial management courses at the Defense Acquisition University. [wrfast@nps.edu] 
Abstract 
The 2013 Annual Report on the Performance of the Defense Acquisition System 
(USD[AT&L], June 28, 2013) identified a need for additional analysis of recent acquisition 
policies (DoDI 5000.02, December 2008) to reduce program technical risk by requiring 
competitive prototyping for risk reduction and a Preliminary Design Review (PDR) before 
Milestone B. This research uses cost and schedule estimates from Major Defense Acquisition 
Programs (MDAPs) to determine if competitive prototyping and PDRs held prior to Milestone 
B have resulted in mature technologies (defined as Technology Readiness Level 6 or above) 
and subsequently reduced program cost and schedule slippage. 
Introduction 
Research Purpose and Questions 
The purpose of this research is to determine if the DoD Instruction 5000.02 policies 
for Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) relating to competitive prototyping, 
technology readiness, and Preliminary Design Review (PDR) prior to Milestone (MS) B are 
having the desired effect on program outcomes. To help evaluate these policies, the 
following research questions are answered: 
1. Does the knowledge from competitive prototyping and a PDR conducted prior 
to MS B result in better decisions relative to requirements, design, and 
resources? 
2. What are the effects of the competitive prototyping, technology readiness, 
and PDR policies on program costs and program schedules? 
Background 
On June 28, 2013, the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics (USD[AT&L]) released his Performance of the Defense Acquisition System 2013 
Annual Report. In the preface to the report, The Honorable Frank Kendall called for data-
driven analysis to find out what was working in the defense acquisition process. The report 
concludes with several policies and processes for additional analysis, including 
 Setting Preliminary Design Review (PDR) before Milestone B 
 Competitive Prototyping for Risk Reduction, not Proof of Concept 
 Reducing technical risks during Technology Development phase 
(USD[AT&L], 2013b, p. 105) 
These three policies all relate to technical risk reduction through competitive 
prototyping to inform requirements trades prior to Milestone B. These policies were first 
included in the December 8, 2008 version of DoD Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the 
Defense Acquisition System. The next year, several of these policies were codified in the 
Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) of 2009 (Public Law 111-23; WSARA of 
2009, §§ 201 and 203).  
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However, the policies actually begin with a memorandum by a former USD(AT&L), 
the Honorable John Young. On September 19, 2007, Young mandated that the Military 
Services and Defense Agencies “formulate all pending and future programs with acquisition 
strategies and funding that provide for two or more competing teams producing prototypes 
through Milestone (MS) B.” Young went on to claim that “competing teams producing 
prototypes of key system elements will reduce technical risk, validate designs, validate cost 
estimates, evaluate manufacturing processes, and refine requirements. In total, this 
approach will also reduce time to fielding” (USD[AT&L], 2007). Young’s policy memorandum 
and related policies on technology readiness and the use of an early PDR were incorporated 
into the December 8, 2008, version of DoD Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the Defense 
Acquisition System, as follows in Table 1.  
Table 1. Policies as Found in DoD Instruction 5000.02, December 8, 2008 
(DoD, 2008, pp. 17–21) 
 
These policies were further refined as a result of the WSARA of 2009. On December 
4, 2009, The Honorable Dr. Ashton Carter, USD(AT&L) issued a Directive-Type 
Memorandum (DTM) 09-027—Implementation of the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform 
Act that amended DoD Instruction 5000.02 (December 2, 2008). Specifically related to the 
competitive prototyping policy, DTM 09-027 directed, 
The technology development strategy (TDS) for each MDAP shall provide for 
prototypes of the system or, if a system prototype is not feasible, for 
prototypes of critical subsystems before Milestone (MS) B approval. 
Information technology initiatives shall prototype subsets of overall 
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functionality, with the intention of reducing enterprise architecture risks, 
prioritizing functionality, and facilitating process re-design. 
In addition, DTM 09-027 provided for waivers to the competitive prototyping policy: 
a. The MDA may waive this requirement if: (1) The cost of producing 
competitive prototypes exceeds the expected life-cycle benefits (in constant 
dollars) of producing the prototypes, including the benefits of improved 
performance and increased technological and design maturity that may be 
achieved through competitive prototyping; or (2) The Department of Defense 
would be unable to meet critical national security objectives without such a 
waiver.  
b. If the competitive prototyping requirement is waived, the MDA shall require 
the program to produce a prototype before MS B approval if the expected life-
cycle benefits (in constant dollars) of producing the prototype exceed the cost 
of the prototype and the production of the prototype remains consistent with 
national security objectives (e.g., when the initial operational capability must 
be fielded). 
(DoD, 2009, Attachment 1, pp. 4–5) 
Regarding the PDR policy, DTM 09-027 directed that “PDRs before MS B are 
mandatory for all MDAPs and will be reflected in the TDS to be approved by the MDA at MS 
A. Post-PDR assessments will be conducted in association with MS B preparations and will 
be formally considered by the MDA at the MS B certification review” (DoD, 2009, Attachment 
1, p. 9). 
So, in addition to providing for prototype waivers, DTM 09-027 changed competitive 
prototyping and the requirement for a PDR before MS B from policy to a statutory mandate 
for all MDAPs. 
Finally, DTM 09-07 provided a template for the Section 2366b of Title 10 certification 
required from the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) to the Congress. By signing the 
certification memorandum, the MDA attests that various statutory requirements have been 
met by the program before entering the EMD phase. Among the sample language provided 
in DTM 09-027 are these statements related to the PDR and technology readiness (see 
Appendix A for TRL definitions):  
I have received the results of the preliminary design review and conducted a 
formal post-preliminary design review assessment, and certify on the basis of 
such assessment that the program demonstrates a high likelihood of 
accomplishing its intended mission.  
The technology in the program has been demonstrated in a relevant 
environment, as determined by the Milestone Decision Authority on the basis 
of an independent review and assessment by the Director of Defense 
Research and Engineering.  
(DoD, 2009, Attachment 3, pp. 16–17) 
On November 26, 2013, The Honorable Frank Kendall, USD[AT&L] canceled DTM 
09-027 after incorporating all of the statutory requirements of the WSARA of 2009 into 
Interim DoD Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System.  
It should be noted that 20 years before The Honorable John Young, USD[AT&L] 
mandated competitive prototyping for MDAPs, essentially the same requirement appeared 
in the September 1987 version of DoD Instruction 5000.2. That earlier mandate was termed 
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Competitive Prototyping Strategy (CPS) and was required for all MDAPs, if practicable 
(DoDI 5000.2, 1987). One impetus behind the mandate was the Packard Commission’s 
recommendation to place “high priority on building and testing prototype systems to 
demonstrate that new technology can substantially improve military capability, and to 
provide a basis for realistic cost estimates prior to a full-scale development decision” 
(Packard, 1986, p. 55). If a CPS was not planned, the Congress had to be notified, in 
accordance with Section 2365, Title 10, United States Code (DoDI 5000.02, 1987, p. 7, 
paragraph F4). This CPS requirement lasted about five and a half years before it was 
canceled by Change 1 (February 26, 1993) to DoD Instruction 5000.2 (February 23, 1991). 
This was just a few months after Public Law 102-484 (October 1992) repealed the required 
use of a competitive prototyping strategy for MDAPS. The change appears to have been 
part of the wave of acquisition reforms that reflected the need to reduce post–Cold War 
defense spending. 
Literature Review 
An important work on prototyping in DoD weapon system development was 
published in 1992 by RAND. The author, Jeffery A. Drezner, constructed a database of 
programmatic information for 287 programs and surveyed 43 government program 
managers about their use of prototypes, from about 1960 through the late 1980s. He 
categorized how prototypes were used in support of various weapon system acquisition 
strategies. He specifically quantified cost growth and schedule slippage in aerospace 
programs from the Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) of December 1988. Drezner 
concluded that the relationships between prototyping and cost, schedule, and performance 
outcomes were “ambiguous due to the effect of confounding variables” (Drezner, 1992, p. 
68). He could not find any significant statistical differences between outcomes from 
prototyping versus nonprototyping programs. Drezner did not recommend that DoD change 
its DoDI 5000.2 (February 23, 1991) policy mandating competitive prototyping for all major 
weapon systems. Rather, he recommended that each program manager weigh the costs 
and benefits of prototyping against the risks and consequences of proceeding into the next 
phase without the knowledge gained from prototypes (Drezner, 1992, pp. 59–67).  
A more recent RAND study includes a chapter entitled “On Prototyping: Lessons 
from RAND Research.” The authors, Jeffery A. Drezner and Meilinda Huang, summarize the 
work of some 30 papers and reports that deal directly with prototyping or touch on the 
subject. They define prototyping as “a conscious strategy to obtain certain types of 
information to inform specific decisions” (Birkler, 2010, p. 64). They review outcomes from 
both case studies and statistical analyses of prototyping and nonprototyping programs. 
While case studies provide mixed results, they conclude that statistical analyses show that 
programs applying prototyping knowledge prior to the development decision (today’s 
Milestone B) experience less cost growth (Birkler, p. 76). 
Since 2002, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has undertaken an annual 
assessment of selected defense weapon programs. The GAO continues to advocate a 
knowledge-based acquisition approach. They assess the knowledge attained by each 
program in terms of requirements matching resources and maturity of technology prior to 
MS B, a stable design at the Critical Design Review (CDR), and capable and controlled 
production processes prior to MS C. In the past two years, these assessments have 
included a useful survey of selected programs in order to determine if policies, to include the 
policies discussed in the paper, are being followed.  
There are two limitations inherent in the GAO assessments. First, by design, the 
assessments only address selected MDAP-level defense weapon system programs, and 
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selected potential future MDAPs, not all programs. The 2012 GAO assessment looked at 37 
out of 96 total MDAPs and 16 future potential MDAPs. The 2013 GAO assessment looked at 
40 out of 86 total MDAPs and 17 future potential MDAPs. Second, the assessments are 
qualitative vice quantitative. Only limited statistical analyses are performed on the selected 
programs (GAO-12-400SP, 2012 and GAO-13-294SP, 2013). 
There are numerous reports and publications with anecdotal references to the value 
of competitive prototyping to identify technology maturity and the importance of making 
requirements trade-offs at the preliminary design reviews. One such reference is instructive. 
Thomas Christie, who retired in 2005 after 4 years as the Director of Operational Test and 
Evaluation, is a vocal advocate of competitive prototyping and the other reforms in the 
WSARA of 2009. In his essay entitled, Developing, Buying and Fielding Superior Weapon 
Systems, Christie recommends that a “Fly-before-Decide” policy of competitive prototyping 
be mandated for all programs (not just MDAPs) before entering the EMD phase (Christie, 
2011, pp. 121–122). 
Research Methodology 
Cost growth percentages for all MDAPs were obtained from Unit Cost Reports (UCR) 
included in Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs) from the years 2011 and 2012. All MDAPs 
submit an annual SAR, to include an UCR, to the Congress. To handle changes in 
procurement quantities over time, a unit cost number, Program Acquisition Unit Cost 
(PAUC), was used to determine cost growth. PAUC is calculated as follows: 
& 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 & 	
     (1) 
The original PAUC, in base-year dollars, was taken from the UCR) submitted with 
the first annual SAR after MS B for development programs and MS C for production 
programs. In either case, this original PAUC was determined after competitive prototyping 
and after PDRs, if those activities were part of the program’s acquisition strategy. This 
original PAUC was compared with the current UCR PAUC estimate, calculated to the same 
base-year dollars, and reported in the latest annual SAR (2011 and 2012). Thus, the cost 
growth percentage was determined as follows: 
	 	 	 	 	
	 	
	
	 	100	%     (2) 
In addition, the annual SARs identifies if programs have suffered an Acquisition 
Program Baseline (APB) threshold schedule breach. A program breaches its APB threshold 
schedule when its schedule slips beyond the number of months agreed to in the APB signed 
by the Program Manager and the MDA. For SAR reporting purposes, a schedule breach of 6 
months or more from the baseline results in a reportable breach.  
For the past two years, as part of its annual assessments of selected weapon 
programs, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has conducted a survey of current 
and future Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs). The purpose of the survey is to 
determine if various acquisition reform policies and practices are being implemented. From 
the survey data, the GAO has been able to identify some programs that have demonstrated 
technology maturity on prototypes in a relevant environment (Technology Readiness Level 
6) and have conducted a preliminary design review prior to Milestone B (GAO-12-400SP, 
2012 and GAO-13-294SP, 2013). These programs are listed in Appendix B.  
Descriptive statistics are used to analyze cost growth (percent change to date in 
PAUC) and schedule breaches for the MDAPs that have conducted competitive prototyping 
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and PDR activities. Similar descriptive statistics are used to analyze the balance of the 
MDAPs included in a particular annual SAR submission. For example, there were 89 total 
MDAPs reported in the 2011 SAR submission. Of these MDAPs, 33 were identified by the 
GAO survey as having demonstrated technology maturity on prototypes in a relevant 
environment (TRL 6) and having conducted a PDR. The remaining 56 programs may or may 
not have used prototypes or achieved TRL 6 or conducted a PDR. The percentage of 
programs that have negative cost growth (negative percent change to date in PAUC) from 
each population is compared. The population with the highest number of negative cost 
growth programs is preferred. Similarly, the percentage of programs that suffered an APB 
schedule threshold breach from each population is compared. The population with the 
lowest percent of schedule breaches is preferred. 
Results Analysis and Conclusion 
Research results are summarized in Tables 2 through 5 of Appendix C.  
PAUC Cost Growth Results. Based upon data from the 2011 SAR (Table 2), 
programs that demonstrated technology maturity on prototypes in a relevant environment 
(TRL 6) and conducted a preliminary design review prior to Milestone B were more often to 
show negative PAUC cost growth. Moreover, this result was seen in all DoD Components. 
Similar results were found in the data from the 2012 SAR (Table 3). 
Caution is needed when interpreting these results. While all cost growth was 
measured from the original baseline, that baseline may have been different, depending on 
the point at which the program was initiated. Most programs establish their original baseline 
at the development decision, MS B. However, programs making use of non-developmental 
and commercial off-the-shelf items may be approved for program initiation at the production 
decision, MS C. Thus, the original baseline upon which cost growth is measured would also 
be established at MS C, vice MS B. 
Cost growth was measured based upon the change in cost estimates, not actual 
costs. Cost estimates change for various reasons. The annual SAR reports (DoD, 2011 and 
DoD, 2012) show these categories of reasons for cost changes between the baseline and 
current cost estimates: quantity, schedule, engineering, support, estimating, and other. By 
using PAUC as the cost metric, this research has adjusted for changes in the cost estimates 
due to quantity. Cost changes due to schedule, engineering, and support could be directly 
attributable to the use of competitive prototypes to identify technology maturity and the use 
of a PDR prior to MS B. However, cost changes due to estimating would indicate that 
competitive prototyping and an early PDR did not help refine the cost estimate. 
Schedule Threshold Breach Results. Based upon data from the 2011 SAR (Table 4), 
programs that demonstrated technology maturity on prototypes in a relevant environment 
(TRL 6) and conducted a preliminary design review prior to Milestone B did not suffer fewer 
APB schedule threshold breaches. Similar results were found in the data from the 2012 SAR 
(Table 5). 
While the cost growth results seem to support the value of demonstrating technology 
maturity on prototypes (TRL 6) and conducting an early preliminary design review (before 
MS B), the schedule threshold breach results do not. There may be several reasons for this.  
First, a reportable schedule breach is 6 months of schedule slippage from the 
previous SAR. All MDAPS must submit an annual SAR. And, if a unit cost or schedule 
breach occurs, the program must submit a SAR every quarter. So, a schedule breach is 
going to be reported relatively quickly after it occurs. In this research, the schedule breach 
metric only indicates that there was a schedule slippage of at least 6 months. The metric 
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does not quantify the total number of months of slippage suffered by the program. Thus, if 
the two populations of programs were compared using the total months of schedule 
slippage, there might have been a different outcome. 
Like cost estimates, baseline schedules are also estimates that can change for 
reasons other than execution performance of the development and production efforts. 
Funding availability can delay a development or disrupt production. For example, Warfighter 
Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) Increment 3 breached its threshold schedule due to a 
decrement in the FY 2014 President’s Budget (DoD, 2011). Alignment of supporting 
program schedules can also cause delays. For example, a 3-year slippage in the Initial 
Operational Capability (IOC) date for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Mine Countermeasures 
Mission (MCM) package caused a reportable schedule breach for the MH-60S Multi-Mission 
Helicopter (DoD, 2011).  
Finally, a comparison should be made between the earlier research by RAND based 
upon 1960-1980 program data (Drezner, 1992) and this research based upon 1990–2012 
program data. Drezner’s work was done in an era when defense acquisition programs were 
not required to use TRLs to assess the maturity of critical technologies. The DoD adopted 
TRLs from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and first introduced 
them as a tool for program managers in the early 2000s. In addition, prior to the 2008 
version of DoD Instruction 5000.2, acquisition policy did not emphasize the importance of 
the PDR. DoD Instruction 5000.02 (2008) elevated oversight of the PDR by requiring a Post 
Preliminary Design Review Assessment (Post-PDRA) at the MDA level (DoD, 2008). This 
emphasis is certain to have caught the attention of program managers and motivated them 
to pay more attention to technology readiness and PDR policies. Perhaps this recent 
emphasis has had an effect on reducing cost growth and schedule slippages in the 
programs used in this research. 
Recommendations for Further Research 
It is doubtful that the USD[AT&L] will ever be able to truly determine the effect of the 
competitive prototyping, technology readiness, and early PDR policies on program cost 
growth or schedule slippage. As Drezner said, “One fundamental problem is that while we 
can examine prototyping programs, or compare the outcomes of prototyping and 
nonprototyping programs, the outcome for the same program with and without prototyping 
can never be known” (Drezner, 1992, p. 59). However, there are some things that can be 
done to improve the imperfect research to date. 
First, to determine cost growth, compare PAUC based upon the original cost 
estimate with actual PAUC. Actual PAUC can be determined from contracts found in the 
Defense Cost and Resource Center (DCARC) database. The percentage of growth from the 
PAUC based upon the original cost estimate (at program initiation) and the actual PAUC (at 
the end of the development and production program) would remove some of the uncertainty 
in this metric.  
Second, to determine schedule slippage, compare the original schedule estimate 
with actual schedule performance data. Again, the actual schedule performance data for this 
comparison should be available in the DCARC database or Defense Acquisition 
Management Information Retrieval (DAMIR). The percentage of growth from the original 
schedule estimate to the actual schedule performance would remove some of the 
uncertainty in this metric. 
Finally, the challenge in using cost growth and schedule slippage metrics is to tie 
them back to the use of competitive prototyping (to reveal technology readiness) and the 
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use of an early PDR. Drezner said that prototyping is “a conscious strategy to obtain certain 
types of information to inform specific decisions” (Birkler, 2010, p. 64). The same can be 
said for technology readiness and PDRs. The knowledge from these activities and how that 
knowledge is applied will tell us whether these policies have had an effect. To that end, 
more detailed surveys, such as those conducted annually on selected weapon systems by 
the GAO, will aid in helping establish the cause-effect relationship between policy and 
program outcomes. 
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Appendix B. Programs Identified as Using Competitive Prototyping and 
Preliminary Design Reviews (PDR) 
 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ãW=
`êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=`Ü~åÖÉ= = - 474 - 
 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ãW=
`êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=`Ü~åÖÉ= = - 475 - 
Appendix C. Results of Research 
Table 2. Programs Costing Less, Selected Acquisition Report, December 31, 2011 
 
Table 3. Programs Costing Less, Selected Acquisition Report, December 31, 2012 
 
Table 4. Program Schedule Breach, Selected Acquisition Report, December 31, 2011 
 
Table 5. Program Schedule Breach, Selected Acquisition Report, December 31, 2012 
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